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Abstract Emotional disorders are characterized by cog-
nitive biases towards negative stimuli, and a lack of biases
towards positive ones. Therefore, we developed a cognitive
bias modification training, modifying approach-avoidance
tendencies to diverse emotional pictures. In Study 1, a
negative training (pull negative, push positive pictures) was
compared to a positive training (vice versa) in 141 stu-
dents. The pre-existing positivity bias remained after pos-
itive training, but reversed into a negativity bias after
negative training. This effect transferred to an attentional
bias. The training affected neither mood nor emotional
vulnerability to stress. In Study 2, we investigated the
effects of the positive training in 102 dysphoric and non-
dysphoric students, all in a sad mood state. Compared to
placebo training, the positive training strengthened a pos-
itivity bias, and it reduced emotional vulnerability in dys-
phoric students. This suggests potential therapeutic value
of the training, but further studies are needed.
Keywords Approach-avoidance  Positivity training 
Emotional vulnerability
Introduction
According to cognitive theories, the development and
maintenance of emotional disorders such as depression or
anxiety can be partly attributed to selective processing of
emotionally relevant information, also referred to as cog-
nitive biases (e.g., Beck and Clark 1997; Mathews and
MacLeod 2005; Rapee and Heimberg 1997). Individuals
suffering from emotional disorders and those with a higher
vulnerability (MacLeod and Mathews 2012) selectively
attend to negative or potentially threatening information,
they remember it better, and they interpret ambiguous
stimuli in a more negative or dysfunctional manner than
healthy individuals do (see Hertel and Mathews 2011;
Mathews and MacLeod 2005). In addition to these biases
towards negative materials, a lack of positive biases also
characterizes many emotional disorders (e.g., Liang et al.
2011), whereas healthy individuals preferentially process
positive information (e.g., Deldin et al. 2001; Dunn et al.
2007; Joormann and Gotlib 2007). This positivity bias
plays an important role in mood regulation (e.g., Isaacowitz
et al. 2009; Joormann et al. 2007; Xing and Isaacowitz
2006). Thus, it seems that both the presence of negative
biases and the absence of positive biases are characteristic
of emotional disorders.
In order to identify whether cognitive biases are more
than mere symptoms of the emotional disorders,
researchers developed so-called cognitive bias modification
(CBM) paradigms. These are various computerized train-
ing methods that can be used to experimentally manipulate
cognitive biases in attention, memory, interpretation, or
approach-avoidance tendencies. Studies making use of
CBM paradigms provided increasing evidence for the
causal role of cognitive biases in emotional vulnerability
and dysfunction (Clarke et al. 2008; MacLeod et al. 2002;
See et al. 2009). Moreover, CBM procedures may also be
of therapeutic value in clinical settings. A growing body of
literature shows that various forms of extended CBM
procedures can effectively reduce clinical symptoms (for a
meta-analysis, see Hallion and Ruscio 2011), for instance
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in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; for a meta-analysis
see, Hakamata et al. 2010), social anxiety disorder (e.g.,
Beard and Amir 2008; see Beard et al. 2012, for a review),
generalized social phobia (Amir et al. 2009), and depres-
sion (Wells and Beevers 2010). Also, CBM procedures can
help to decrease relapse rates in alcoholics (Wiers et al.
2011; Eberl et al. 2013).
While most CBM studies focused on the experimental
manipulation of negativity biases, only a few CBM studies
have experimentally addressed the protective role of posi-
tive information processing in emotional vulnerability.
Johnson (2009) explicitly instructed participants to selec-
tively attend to happy faces and to avoid angry faces during
a dot-probe task. Compared to a group which received no
instructions, participants who attended to positive faces
reported less frustration in response to a subsequent stres-
sor. Similarly, Taylor et al. (2011) showed that greater
shifts in attention towards positive, social-evaluative word
stimuli following attention training were related to atten-
uated anxiety reactivity.
Furthermore, most of the CBM studies so far made use
of stimulus materials that were highly disorder-specific,
such as social-evaluative words or faces expressing disgust
in social anxiety (e.g., Taylor et al. 2011). However, there
is at least one study showing that in healthy children
(Broeren and Lester 2013), a bias towards positive mate-
rials is not restricted to specific content. Instead, it extends
to all positive information that is relevant to the child,
suggesting that the positivity bias in healthy individuals
reflects a general orientation. It is conceivable that in
healthy adults, the positivity bias is also of a more general
nature. Thus, it might be important to focus on the pro-
cessing of diverse categories of positive information
instead of content-specific stimuli, when aiming to facili-
tate a positivity bias in emotionally disordered patients.
This view is supported by new developments in treat-
ment, which suggest to focus on the commonalities in biased
information processing between different emotional disor-
ders and on the development of unified treatment protocols,
in order to facilitate treatment efficiency and efficacy
(Moses and Barlow 2006), which is also supported by the
tripartite model (Clark and Watson 1991), in which a gen-
eral negative affectivity component is assumed to be a
higher-order factor for both anxiety and depression, whereas
anxiety and depression differ in symptomatology only at a
‘lower’ level. Moses and Barlow (2006) also suggest that a
unified treatment approach for emotional disorders should
contain the modification of emotion-driven behaviors (so-
called action tendencies). According to approach-avoidance
models (e.g., Elliot 2006), positive stimuli elicit approach
motivations and subsequently approach behavior, while
negative stimuli elicit avoidance motivation and avoidance
behavior. In emotional disorders, these natural tendencies
are frequently compromised. For instance, individuals with
depressed symptoms show low reward sensitivity, which is
associated with lower approach behavior towards rewarding
cues. At the same time, these individuals show difficulties in
disengaging from negative stimuli, reflected in a range of
biases promoting the processing of negative information
(see Trew 2011). Consequently, they might profit from a
training that simultaneously promotes approach towards
positive cues and avoidance from negative cues.
Action tendencies can be efficiently measured in
experimental settings by using an approach-avoidance task
(AAT, Rinck and Becker 2007), and there are a number of
studies that examined these approach-avoidance tendencies
in patient samples (e.g., Heuer et al. 2007; Lange et al.
2008; Reinecke et al. 2012; Schuck et al. 2012). Most
interestingly, the approach-avoidance task has also been
used successfully for cognitive bias modification: Patients
were trained to use a joystick to pull pictures of positive,
healthy stimuli closer, and push pictures of unhealthy,
negative pictures away. For instance, an alcohol-avoidance
training for alcohol-dependent patients reduced relapse
rates significantly (Eberl et al. 2013, 2014; Wiers et al.
2011). Moreover, there are promising results regarding the
training to approach faces in social anxiety (Rinck et al.
2013; Taylor and Amir 2012). Therefore, the training of
approach-avoidance tendencies might be a good starting
point, especially with the goal of a more unified treatment
approach. It is important to note that this training differs
from most previous ones in that it does not train attentional
vigilance or avoidance. In fact, in the AAT, single pictures
are presented, and the participant has to attend to each one
before pulling it closer (approach) or pushing it away
(avoidance). Thus, attention is held constantly high, while
action tendencies are selectively trained.
To sum up, most CBM studies focused on the elimina-
tion of biases towards content-specific negative cues. There
is a lack of CBM techniques designed to promote a
healthier bias towards non-specific positive information
and simultaneously eliminate an unspecific negativity bias.
The lack of a positivity bias is associated with difficulties
in emotion regulation. Exploring the promotion of a gen-
eral positivity bias by means of CBM training techniques,
rather than focusing on the isolated reduction of disorder-
specific negative biases, is an interesting new approach
with high theoretical impact. Above that, CBM that fosters
a broad positive bias might be a powerful cognitive inter-
vention with high efficiency, which will add to the devel-
opment of treatments and prevention programs of
emotional disorders.
Following this line of reasoning, we developed a CBM
procedure which includes diverse categories of positive
and negative pictures (e.g., objects, animals, humans), in
order to train general, disorder-nonspecific action
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tendencies. Consequently, the emotional stimuli do not
apply to any disorder in particular. In the positive training
condition, the training strengthens the approach of positive
stimuli and simultaneously the avoidance of negative
stimuli. Both contingencies (approach positive, avoid
negative) foster a differential reaction pattern based on
stimulus valence across a broad range of categories. During
this general approach-positive-avoid-negative training (in
short: positivity training), participants have to react to
pictures on a computer screen by pulling or pushing a
joystick. Depending on the joystick movement, the pictures
increase or decrease in size, creating an approach or
avoidance impression, respectively.
In the first study, we investigated whether such a general
training is indeed able to modify pre-existing approach-
avoidance tendencies, and if the modification generalizes
to other cognitive processes (i.e., attention). Moreover, we
examined whether this training affects emotional vulnera-
bility. Given the proof-of-principle nature of this first
study, we did not include a neutral control condition.
Instead, we compared an approach-positive-avoid-negative
training to the opposite approach-negative-avoid-positive
training. In the second study, we followed a more clinical
approach by investigating the effects of the general posi-
tivity training in a sample of dysphoric and non-dysphoric
students.
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether a general
approach-avoidance training with diverse emotional pic-
tures is able to modify action tendencies, whether the effect
generalizes to attentional biases, and if the training affects
emotional reactivity to a stressor. To this end, participants
received a general approach-avoidance training, either
towards positive and away from negative pictures (PT:
positivity training) or towards negative and away from
positive pictures (NT: negativity training). These two
groups were then compared with regard to changes in
approach-avoidance tendencies. Participants receiving the
PT were expected to become faster at pushing negative
pictures and pulling positive pictures than vice versa
(indicative of a positivity bias), whereas participants
receiving the NT were expected to become faster at pulling
negative pictures and pushing positive pictures than vice
versa (indicative of a negativity bias).
It has been suggested that approach or avoidance
movements influence the motivational orientation and
subsequently enhance the processing of positive or nega-
tive stimuli (positive–approach, negative–avoidance; Neu-
mann and Strack 2000). To examine such putative
crossover effects of the modified approach-avoidance
tendencies on attentional processes, participants’ atten-
tional bias was measured by means of a dot-probe task after
the training. We expected that the training effects would
generalize to an attentional bias, with the NT group
attending more to negative stimuli and the PT group more
to positive stimuli.
In line with earlier research on the relationship between
cognitive biases and emotional vulnerability, it was finally
expected that, compared to the negativity training, the
positivity training would result in attenuated stress-reac-
tivity to a subsequent stressful task. Based on previous
findings of, for instance, MacLeod et al. (2002), we did not
expect a direct effect of the training on mood.
Methods
Participants
Participants of this study were 141 first-year psychology
and educational science students of Radboud University
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. They were randomly assigned
to either the PT group or the NT group. The groups did not
differ in age (PT: M = 20.46, SD = 2.86; NT: M = 20.61,
SD = 2.63; t(139) = .32, p = .749), gender (PT: 11 males,
59 females; NT = 8 males, 63 females; v2(1, 141) = .60,
p = .439), or mood before the experiment (PT: M = 5.89,
SD = 4.31; NT: M = 6.10, SD = 3.99; t(139) = .30,
p = .642). Participants received course credit in return for
their participation.
Materials
Mood Scales Participants had to indicate their current
mood state at four different time points during the exper-
iment. For this purpose, statements were presented on a
computer screen and participants had to indicate on a six-
point Likert scale to what extent they agreed or disagreed
with it. Three of these statements (happiness, sadness,
relief) reflected a depression-related dimension. They were
included to check whether the training had any undesired
and immediate negative effects on mood. The other three
statements (tension, relaxation, anxiety) reflected a stress-
related mood dimension. They were included to measure
effects of the anagram stress task on stress vulnerability.
Emotional Pictures A set of 100 positive and 100 nega-
tive pictures, representing a broad range of different cate-
gories (e.g., animals, humans, objects) were selected from
several sources, including the International Affective Pic-
ture System (IAPS; Lang et al. 2005) and the Karolinska
Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF; Lundqvist
et al. 1998). Positive and negative pictures were of
equivalent emotional intensity, and they were selected to
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123
be gender-non-specific. The pictures were selected based
on the ratings supplied by the authors of the IAPS and the
KDEF. Highly arousing pictures (e.g., mutilations, sexual
activities) were excluded. Two equivalent sets of 50 posi-
tive and 50 negative pictures each were created. For each
participant, only one of the two sets was used in the
training AAT, and we counterbalanced across participants
which set was used during the training. Afterwards, all
pictures were used in the dot-probe task to allow for a test
of generalization to untrained pictures.
For the AAT, each picture existed in a slightly left-tilted
(5) and in a slightly right-tilted (5) version. Moreover, to
allow for the zooming effect of the AAT, seven different
sizes of each picture version were created, with the largest
picture filling the full height of the computer screen (768
pixels), and the smallest picture being approx. 90 pixels
high (as described in Rinck and Becker 2007). Depending
on the orientation of the picture (landscape or portrait), the
width varied between 70 pixels (smallest portrait) and 1024
pixels (largest landscape). Corners and edges of the pic-
tures were blurred in order to prevent participants from
responding by looking at the pictures’ corners only.
Experimental Tasks
Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) During the whole AAT,
the participants’ task was to respond to the pictures by
pulling or pushing a joystick that was securely positioned
in the middle of the table in front of the computer screen.
The participants initiated each trial by holding the joystick
in a central position and pressing a button of the joystick
with the index finger, upon which a picture of medium size
appeared on the screen. Participants were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible to the tilt of each picture, by
pulling left-tilted pictures closer and pushing right-tilted
ones away with the joystick. To create the visual impres-
sion that the picture itself was pushed away or pulled
closer, the picture changed in size dynamically with every
joystick movement. As soon as the joystick was moved by
all the way into the correct direction, the picture disap-
peared and the trial ended with a black screen. If the joy-
stick was moved into the incorrect direction, the picture did
not disappear. Participants then had to correct their
movement in order to be able to proceed to the following
trial. Response accuracy therefore was 100 % for all trials.
The computer automatically recorded participants’ move-
ments and reaction times (RTs), that is, the time from
appearance of each picture to its disappearance.
The training in this study was divided into five phases.
The first phase consisted of 10 practice trials. This was
followed by an assessment AAT that consisted of 40 trials,
in which both positive and negative pictures had to be both
pulled and pushed equally often. Immediately after this
assessment and unbeknown to the participants, the training
AAT followed, consisting of 380 trials. In this phase,
participants in the positive training group (PT) had to pull
all positive pictures closer and to push all negative ones
away. For participants in negative training group (NT), the
contingencies were reversed. Thereafter and again unbe-
known to participants, the training AAT changed into a
post-assessment AAT that was identical to the pre-assess-
ment. Since we did not aim to investigate generalization of
training effects within the training itself, all pictures pre-
sented in the pre- and post-assessment were also used
during training. Finally, after the dot probe task (see
below), a booster-training block of 100 trials was admin-
istered to ensure that training effects were not reduced by
the dot probe task. The whole joystick task took approxi-
mately 25 min, with three short breaks during the training
phase.
Dot-Probe Task Each dot-probe trial commenced with a
500 ms fixation cross in the center of the screen. After-
wards, a positive and a negative picture appeared above
and below the center of the screen. The position of the
pictures was randomized, such that each picture appeared
in the upper or lower screen location with equal probabil-
ity. The pictures were presented for 500 ms, after which an
arrow (pointing left or right) appeared at the position of one
of the pictures. Participants were asked to react to the
arrow as quickly and correctly as possible by pressing
either a left or a right button on the keyboard, depending on
whether the arrow pointed to the left or to the right. Upon
the participant’s response, the screen was cleared and fol-
lowed by a new trial.
The whole task consisted of 10 practice trials and 100
assessment trials. On half of the trials, the probe replaced
the positive picture and on the other half, it replaced the
negative picture. In order to test generalization effects of
the training on attention bias, 50 picture pairs were inclu-
ded that consisted of the pictures previously used in the
AAT (trained pictures), while the other 50 picture pairs
consisted of new pictures (untrained pictures). Trained and
untrained picture pairs were presented in random order.
Anagram-Stress Task To elicit stress in the participants,
an adapted version of the anagram-stress task by MacLeod
et al. (2002) was used. Twenty letter strings were con-
structed for this task. Seven of these anagrams were solvable
(2 easy, 5 difficult) in that the letters within each string could
be rearranged to spell a word. Thirteen of the anagrams were
unsolvable, in that the letter strings could not be rearranged
to form any word. However, all anagrams were described as
being solvable. As some participants were of German origin,
a German version and a Dutch version of the task were
created. Participants were instructed to solve as many
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anagrams as possible in a period of 5 min. The anagrams
were presented on a sheet of paper, and participants were
free to skip anagrams they could not solve. After 5 min, the
experimenter returned to the room and indicated, indepen-
dently of the real performance, that the participant’s per-
formance level was unusually low.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. After providing
informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to
either the PT group or the NT group, after which they filled
in both mood scales and completed the AAT. Next, the
mood scales were presented for the second time. Then,
participants completed the dot-probe task followed by the
AAT booster-training, to make sure that the dot-probe task
did not reduce AAT training effects. After that, participants
had to fill in the mood scales for the third time. In order to
assess effects of the AAT training on emotional vulnera-
bility, participants subsequently completed the anagram
stress task, and filled in the mood scales for the last time.
At the end of the session, participants filled in an awareness
check questionnaire and were paid. All participants were
debriefed per e-mail after the end of data collection.
Results
AAT Training Effect
To evaluate changes in the approach-avoidance tendencies
between the two assessment phases (i.e., before versus after
the training AAT), median RTs were calculated for the 4
combinations of pushing versus pulling and positive versus
negative pictures. Hereby, the fastest and the slowest 1 % of
all RTswere excluded to reduce the potential effect of outliers.
As the response accuracy of this task is necessarily 100 % as
explained above, there were no RTs of incorrect responses to
be excluded. A compatibility score was computed separately
for each participant and each assessment phase (pre and post)
by subtracting median RTs of compatible trials (i.e., pull
positive pictures, push negative pictures) from median RTs of
incompatible trials (i.e., push positive pictures, pull negative
pictures). Positive compatibility scores reflect faster reactions
on compatible trials (i.e., a positivity bias).
The compatibility effects were then subjected to a 2
(within-subjects factor time: pretest vs. posttest) 9 2 (be-
tween-subjects factor group: PT vs. NT) repeated measures
analysis. This analysis revealed the expected significant
interaction, F(1, 139) = 36.77, p\ .001, gp
2 = .21. Sepa-
rate analyses for each group indicated that only the NT
group showed the expected training effect, F(1,
70) = 61.33, p\ .001, gp
2 = .47: In line with their training
condition, they reacted faster on compatible trials than on
incompatible trials before the training, and faster on
incompatible trials than on compatible trials after the
training. This effect was not found for the PT group, F(1,
69) = .39, p[ .5, gp
2 = .01; their pre-existing positive
compatibility effect remained unchanged (see Table 1 for
means and SDs).
Dot-Probe Task
To analyze crossover effects from the AAT to the dot-
probe task, we again computed a bias score. Only correct
trials of the dot-probe task were taken into the analyses,
after excluding the fastest 1 % and the slowest 1 % of all
remaining reaction times. Of these trials, median RTs were
calculated per participant, separately for each of the four
combinations of picture type (trained vs. untrained) and
probe location (positive vs. negative picture). These med-
ian RTs were subjected to a 2 (between-subjects factor
Group: PT vs. NT) 9 2 (within-subjects factor picture
type: trained vs. untrained) 9 2 (within-subjects factor
probe location: positive picture vs. negative picture)
repeated-measures ANOVA.
The analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction
between probe location and group, F(1, 139) = 8.11,
p = .005, gp
2 = .06, indicating the expected crossover
effect from the AAT training to the dot-probe task. Adding
the initial compatibility effect as a covariate to the analysis
revealed that this interaction effect was moderated by the
compatibility scores, F(1, 137) = 4.23, p = .041,
gp
2 = .03. This suggests that the effect of approach-
avoidance training on attention was more pronounced in
participants with an initially low compatibility effect.
Separate analyses for the two groups showed that the PT
group reacted more quickly when the probe replaced the
positive picture (M = 595, SD = 42) than when it replaced
the negative one (M = 602, SD = 44), F(1, 69) = 5.74,
p = .019, gp
2 = .08. In the NT group, RTs for positive
pictures (M = 600, SD = 54) and negative pictures
(M = 596, SD = 55) did not differ significantly, F(1,
70) = 2.7, p[ .10, gp
2 = .04. The probe location by group
interaction was marginally significant for both untrained
pictures, F(1, 139) = 3.86, p = .051, gp
2 = .03, and
trained pictures, F(1, 139) = 3.70, p = .056, gp
2 = .03,
pointing to a generalization from trained to untrained pic-
tures. Because of the similar effects observed for trained
and untrained pictures, the three-way interaction of probe
location, picture type, and group was not significant, F(1,
139) = .10, p[ .7, gp
2 = .001.
Mood and Stress After Training
To analyze immediate effects of the training on mood, a
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was
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conducted to compare the two groups’ mood state after the
training, with the three mood ratings (happy, sad, relieved)
as dependent variable, and group as independent variable
(see Table 2). Mood ratings before the training served as
covariates. A corresponding analysis was conducted on the
three stress ratings (tense, anxious, relaxed). The MAN-
COVA was favored over a repeated-measures ANOVA
because the stress scales showed violations of sphericity
(Stevens 2002). The analyses revealed neither an imme-
diate training effect on the mood scales nor on the stress
scales (p[ .398). Including the baseline compatibility
scores as a covariate resulted in a marginally significant
interaction effect of baseline compatibility scores with
training on mood, F(3, 132) = 2.46, p = .066, gp
2 = .05,
which was mainly caused by the happiness subscale, F(1,
134) = 2.16, p = .083, gp
2 = .02. This suggests that
stronger compatibility scores were related to higher hap-
piness after the training.
Mood and Stress After Anagram Task
To assess effects of the training on emotional reactivity to
the anagram-stress task, MANCOVAs were conducted for
the three stress ratings and the three mood ratings, with the
same scales prior to the task serving as covariates (see
Table 2). The MANCOVAs of the stress scale and the
mood scale after the anagram-stress task indicated no
training effect either (p[ .3).1
1 Including the baseline compatibility effect as a covariate did not
change the results (p[ .162).
Table 1 Mean reaction times
(standard deviations) in
milliseconds of the Approach-
Avoidance Training and the
resulting compatibility effects in
Study 1

















































Table 2 Mean scores (standard
deviations) of mood and stress
scores before (T1) and after
(T2) the training and before
(T3) and after (T4) the stress
task in Study 1
Positive training Negative training
T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4
Mood
Happy 4.13 3.83 3.71 3.5 4.13 3.66 3.58 3.41
(1.05) (1.09) (1.17) (1.16) (1.1) (1.21) (1.17) (1.21)
Sad 1.71 1.73 1.64 1.77 1.56 1.73 1.63 1.73
(1.17) (.98) (.95) (1.07) (1.04) (1.03) (1) (1.15)
Relieved 2.91 3.06 3.2 3.07 2.72 2.68 2.76 2.69
(1.07) (1.06) (1.11) (1.15) (1.61) (1.23) (1.21) (1.27)
Stress
Tense 2.44 2.33 2.11 2.26 2 2 1.87 2.35
(1.34) (1.27) (1.08) (1.33) (1.32) (1.7) (1.04) (1.28)
Anxious 1.39 1.5 1.46 1.44 1.32 1.44 1.31 1.37
(.8) (.81) (.79) (.9) (.82) (.81) (.73) (.76)
Relaxed 4.1 3.9 3.94 3.79 4.14 3.82 4.14 3.93
(1.26) (1.19) (1.41) (1.36) (1.42) (1.27) (1.25) (1.29)
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Discussion
The results of Study 1 indicate that it is possible to modify
action tendencies by means of a general approach-avoid-
ance training. Specifically, the NT was able to reverse a
positive compatibility effect (i.e., positivity bias) into a
negative one: Participants of the NT group became faster to
approach negative pictures and to avoid positive pictures.
This finding suggests that CBM training effects are not
restricted to the use of specific, disorder-relevant stimuli.
Instead, they extend to the processing of unspecific, emo-
tionally valenced information in general. However, the
positivity training was not effective in increasing an
existing positivity bias even further. This might be attri-
butable to the pre-existing compatibility effect: Both
groups showed a positivity bias before the training,
indicative of faster approach reactions to positive and faster
avoidance reactions to negative stimuli. In terms of a
ceiling effect, strengthening an already existing bias is
more difficult than altering a bias by means of training (i.e.,
reversing a positive bias into a negative one). It therefore
remains to be established if a positivity bias can be induced
in individuals who lack such a positive bias, or if a nega-
tivity bias can be reversed by means of the positivity
training.
Furthermore, a crossover effect of the AAT on the dot-
probe task was found: After the training, the groups dif-
fered in their attention allocation to positive and negative
stimuli, such that attention was biased towards the class of
previously approached stimuli. These results support the
assumption that not only perceptions automatically trigger
a motivational orientation and corresponding action ten-
dencies, but that there is also a causal effect in the opposite
direction: Approach-avoidance movements may influence
the motivational orientation and subsequently enhance the
processing of approached stimuli (Neumann and Strack
2000). Importantly, these results also indicate that the
approach-avoidance training did not merely work at the
stimulus–response level: Participants learned to connect a
kind of movement (e.g., pull) with a whole class of stimuli
(e.g., positive pictures). This suggests a general influence
of the AAT on the processing of emotionally valenced
information.
Subsequent analyses revealed that the PT group
showed an attentional bias towards positive pictures after
the training, whereas no bias was found in the NT group.
As described above, the AAT reversed the pre-existing,
positive approach-avoidance bias in the NT group, which
might explain the lack of a positive attentional bias in this
group. This is supported by the fact that the PT group
showed a positive attentional bias, as typically found in
healthy participants (Joormann and Gotlib 2007). Unfor-
tunately, we did not measure the attentional bias prior to
the AAT. Inferences about changes in bias from pre- to
post-training are thus based on assumptions that cannot be
tested with the data of the current study. Clearly, future
studies should include both pre- and post-measures of
attentional bias.
Regarding our second research question, we found that
there were no direct effects of the AAT on mood. This
suggests that the training procedures did not serve as a
mood induction. This finding is in line with the existing
literature, which suggests that CBM training effects
become apparent only when participants are subsequently
exposed to a stressful situation (for a review see, Hallion
and Ruscio 2011). However, we did not find such previ-
ously reported, attenuating effects on emotional vulnera-
bility either. The trainings did not differentially affect
stress reactivity of participants in response to the subse-
quent anagram task. This suggests that the general
approach-avoidance training might not have an impact on
emotional vulnerability. An alternative explanation for the
absence of an effect of training on emotional vulnerability
might be that the stress task used in this experiment was not
adequate for inducing sufficiently high stress levels. This is
also reflected in the generally low stress scores observed. In
order to facilitate differences in stress reactivity between
the groups, the task might need to be adapted in order to
provoke stronger stress experiences.
Study 2
Study 1 showed that a general approach-avoidance training
is effective in modifying pre-existing action tendencies in
healthy individuals and that this effect transfers to atten-
tional processes. In line with previous CBM studies, the
AAT was effective in training individuals towards negative
stimuli. However, we were not able to induce a bias
towards positive stimuli, as the participants already had a
pre-existing positivity bias. As a result of this ceiling
effect, the initial positivity bias remained unchanged in the
positivity-training group.
Therefore, the aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether
the general approach-avoidance training is able to induce a
positivity bias in individuals who are assumed to lack such
a positivity bias. In this study, we investigated the training
in dysphoric and non-dysphoric students. All participants
were brought into a sad mood state, because cognitive
biases are influenced by state effects and seem to come to
play even more clearly as a consequence of depressive trait
factors (Mathews and MacLeod 2005). Above that, we
tested whether the positivity training affects stress reac-
tivity. Because of the additional time needed for the mood
induction, we had to drop the dot-probe task from this
study.
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To prevent a potential ceiling effect like the one
observed in Study 1, a negative mood state (i.e., analogue
depression) was induced prior to the training by means of a
sad movie. Research has shown that such mood inductions
may be sufficient to affect cognitive processes (e.g.,
attention bias: Bradley et al. 1997; memory bias: Fitzgerald
et al. 2011; Matt et al. 1992). A negative mood induction
re-activates latent depressogenic cognitive structures in
emotionally vulnerable individuals (e.g., Beck 1967).
Hence, it also serves to elicit a negativity bias in the dys-
phoric group (for a review on this procedure see Scher
et al. 2005). Considering the importance of positive biases
in emotion regulation, we argue that emotionally vulnera-
ble individuals (dysphoric students) should particularly
benefit from the training.
Study 2 focused on reducing stress reactivity by means
of the general positivity training. Participants were either
trained towards positive stimuli and away from negative
ones (PT group), or they received a sham training (control
group), in which they pulled and pushed positive and
negative pictures equally often. For ethical reasons, the
study did not include training towards negative stimuli.
Again, direct effects of the training on mood as well as
indirect effects on mood in response to a laboratory stressor
were investigated.
In order to address methodological issues discussed with
regard to Study 1, the anagram-stress task in Study 2 was
improved. Specifically, we increased time pressure and we
made the task more credible to participants, in the sense
that anagrams seemed solvable at first glance. Moreover,
the mood rating ‘‘relieved’’ was replaced by ‘‘content’’, as
we considered this item to better reflect a positive mood
state.
We expected that (1) compared to the sham training, a
bias towards positive stimuli can be induced or strength-
ened by means of the general positivity training in both
dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals who are in a sad
mood state. Based on the discussed literature (e.g., Taylor
et al. 2011), we expected that (2) the induced positivity bias
has a buffer function, in that it decreases participants’
negative affective response to a stressful situation. In order
to investigate the therapeutic relevance of the training, we




103 Dutch (n = 63) and German (n = 40) first-year psy-
chology and educational science students of Radboud
University Nijmegen participated in this study in return for
course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either
the training group or the control group. As this study was
designed to address individuals who are in a sad mood,
participants who did not respond to the negative mood
induction were excluded from further analyses (dysphoric:
n = 13; non-dysphoric: n = 29). This resulted in a
remaining sample size of n = 61.
A major aim of the study was to assess the therapeutic
value of the general positivity training for dysphoric indi-
viduals. Consequently, the sample was split into a dys-
phoric and a non-dysphoric group, based on their scores on
the Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS;see below). Fol-
lowing Zung (1973), participants with a sum score of 40 or
lower were classified as non-dysphoric (n = 36), whereas
those scoring higher than 40 were classified as dysphoric
(n = 25). The resulting four groups (i.e., dysphoric-train-
ing vs. dysphoric-control, non-dysphoric-training vs. non-
dysphoric control) did not differ in size, mean age, gender
distribution, or nationality distribution. Moreover, the two
dysphoric groups (training versus control) had comparable
pre-experimental SDS scores (training: M = 46.3,
SD = 3.9; control: M = 47.7, SD = 5.3), as had the two
non-dysphoric groups (training: M = 35.9, SD = 3.1;
control: M = 34.6, SD = 4.6).
Materials
Mood Measurements To assess the presence and magni-
tude of depressive symptoms in the participants, a Dutch
computerized version of the Self-Rating Depression Scale
(SDS; Zung 1965, 1973) was administered, which has been
shown to have good psychometric properties (Peeters et al.
1993). As suggested by Zung (1973), a score above 40 is
used as an indication of mild, clinically significant
depression (see also Bitsika et al. 2010).
To investigate changes in mood, participants rated their
feelings on six mood ratings on a 7-point Likert scale,
ranging from 0 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). These
six mood ratings can be categorized into a depressed mood
dimension and a stress-related mood dimension. The
depressed mood dimension consisted of the ratings happi-
ness, sadness, and contentment. These were used as indi-
cators for a depressive mood state and served as
manipulation check of the mood induction, as well as
dependent variables for the first hypothesis. The stress-re-
lated mood dimension consisted of the ratings tension,
relaxation, and anxiety. These functioned as indicators of
the current stress level of participants and served as
dependent variables for the second hypothesis.
Emotional Pictures For the approach-avoidance task, the
same set of stimuli as in Study 1 was used. However, all
100 positive and 100 negative pictures were presented to
each participant during the training.
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Experimental Tasks
Mood Induction To induce a negative mood state, three
sequences of a sad movie (‘‘Sophie’s Choice’’) were shown
to the participants on a computer screen. These sequences
have repeatedly been effective in eliciting negative mood
(e.g., Randall and Cox 2001). All three sequences together
lasted about 20 min. Before and after each sequence, par-
ticipants were asked to report their current emotion on an
11-point bipolar Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very sad) to
11 (very happy). In the final sample of 61 participants,
these scores changed from 7.0 (SD = 1.9) before the
induction to 2.5 (SD = 1.1) after the mood induction.
Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) As in Study 1, the
training was divided into assessment AAT (40 trials) and
training AAT (380 trials). The assessment AAT was admin-
istered once before and once after the negative mood induc-
tion. Both assessments were preceded by 10 practice trials.
Immediately after the second assessment and unbeknown to
the participants, the training AAT followed. In this phase,
contingencies were changed for the training group only, so
that now all positive pictures had to be pulled closer and all
negative pictures had to be pushed away. The control group
received 380 trials of continued assessment (i.e., sham
training). Thereafter, and again unbeknown to participants,
the trainingAATchanged into a third assessmentAATwhich
was followed by a booster-training block of 100 trials, in
order to ensure that the training effectwould not beweakened
by the third assessment AAT. The whole joystick task took
approximately 30 min, with four breaks in between.
Anagram Stress Task To elicit stress in participants, we
again administered the anagram stress task. However, task
instructions varied slightly from those in Study 1. For the
anagram stress task, 20 letter strings were constructed. Of
these, seven were solvable and 13 were not. A Dutch and a
German version of the task were created. Participants were
instructed on a computer screen to solve as many of these
anagrams as accurately as possible, by writing down the
correct words on a supplied response sheet. The instructions
indicated that most of the anagrams should be easy to solve
within the given time. Each anagram was presented indi-
vidually on the computer screen for 20 s.A clock in the upper
right of the screen counted down the seconds to signal for
each anagram how much time would be left. The anagram
disappeared after twenty seconds, accompanied by a stress-
ful ‘‘beep’’ sound and followed by the next anagram.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. After providing
informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to
either the positivity training or the (sham training) control
group. Then they completed the mood measurements, that
is, the SDS and the six mood ratings. Thereafter, partici-
pants read the instructions for the following AAT assess-
ment. After completion of this first assessment AAT, the
three sequences of the movie ‘‘Sophie’s Choice’’ were
presented. Before starting the clips, the experimenter
dimmed the light, asked participants to clear their minds of
all thoughts and feelings and to put take perspective of the
main actress. Following the movie scenes, participants
again indicated their current mood state on the six mood
ratings. Next, participants received instructions for the
succeeding AAT units (second assessment, training, third
assessment, booster-training).
In order to assess the effect of the AAT training on
emotional vulnerability, participants subsequently com-
pleted the anagram stress task. The six mood ratings were
administered before and afterwards. Before participants
were sent home, they were shown a sequence of the movie
‘‘Happy Feet’’ to elicit a positive mood state (Fitzgerald
et al. 2011). To ensure that participants were able to restore
their mood in response to the positive mood induction, the
six mood ratings were administered for a last time. At the
end of the session, participants filled in an awareness check
questionnaire. Finally they were paid and given the




The group of dysphoric individuals did not significantly
differ from the group of non-dysphoric individuals on the
compatibility effect prior to the training (dysphoric:
M = 92, SD = 139; non-dysphoric: M = 45, SD = 99;
t(59) = 1.55, p[ .1, d = .39). Additionally, one-sample
t-tests revealed that in both groups, the compatibility effect
was significantly positive (non-dysphoric: t(35) = 2.71,
p = .01, d = .92; dysphoric: t(24) = 3.30, p = .003,
d = 1.35). Thus, both groups showed an initial positivity
bias. A 2 (within-subjects factor time: T1 vs. T2) 9 2
(between-subjects factor training: PT group vs. control
group) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
revealed no main effects or interactions, neither for the
dysphoric nor for the non-dysphoric sample (p[ .1) indi-
cating that the positivity bias remained unaffected by the
mood induction procedure.
Approach-Avoidance Training
RTs from the AAT were prepared in the same way as in the
first study, for all three assessment phases separately:
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before the mood induction (T1), before the positivity
training (T2) and after the training (T3). Based on the
median RTs, the compatibility effects were calculated.
These compatibility effects were subjected to a 2 (within-
subjects factor time: T2 vs. T3) 9 2 (between-subjects
factor training: PT group vs. control group) repeated-
measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), using the
compatibility effect at T1 as covariate. To find out whether
the training was effective for both dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants, this analysis was conducted sepa-
rately for the two groups.
The analysis yielded a significant time 9 group interaction
effect for both dysphoric,F(1, 22) = 6.29, p = .02,gp
2 = .22,
and non-dysphoric participants, F(1, 33) = 4.99, p = .032,
gp
2 = .13. This indicates an increase of the compatibility
effects after training in the PT groups (dysphoric: t(9) = 5.29,
p\ .001, d = 1.67; non-dysphoric: t(17) = 2.62, p = .018,
d = .62), compared to the sham-training groups (dysphoric:
t(14) = 1.13, p[ .2, d = .29; non-dysphoric: t(17) = .12,
p[ .9, d = .03). Thus, the trainingwas successful in inducing
a positivity bias in both dysphoric and non-dysphoric students
(see Table 3 for the mean compatibility effects). Moreover,
effectiveness of the training did not depend on the size of the
initial pre-training bias: Within the PT group, there was no
significant correlation of T1 compatibility scores with the T3–
T2 change scores, r(28) = -.07, ns.
Mood After Training
Similar to the first study, immediate effects of training on
mood were assessed by means of a MANCOVA, com-
paring the two groups (training vs. control) on the three
mood ratings (happy, sad, content) directly after the
training, with the three corresponding pre-training ratings
serving as covariates. All MANCOVAs were conducted
separately for dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals. As
in the first study, the MANCOVA was favored above
repeated-measures ANOVAs because we encountered
large violations of sphericity on the stress scales (Stevens
2002). The analysis of the mood ratings yielded no sig-
nificant difference between training and control group,
neither for dysphoric participants, F(3, 18) = .39, p[ .7,
gp
2 = .06, nor for non-dysphoric participants, F(3,
29) = 1.69, p[ .1, gp
2 = .15. When including baseline
compatibility effect as a covariate, a marginally significant
training effect for the non-dysphoric group was revealed,
F(3, 27) = 2.62, p = .071, gp
2 = .23, with participants
from the training condition scoring lower on the content
subscale than the control group (M = 2.94, SD = .8 vs.
M = 3.56, SD = .86; F(1, 29) = 4.24, p = .012, gp
2 = .2).
No group differences were found on the remaining sub-
scales (sad: F(1, 29) = 2.61, p[ .1, gp
2 = .06; happy: F(1,
29) = .91, p[ .3, gp
2 = .04) (see Table 4).
Stress After Training
The same analyses as above were computed with the three
stress ratings (tense, relaxed, anxious). A MANCOVA on
the stress scales revealed no training effect for either
sample (p[ .7).2
Mood After Anagram Task
To investigate effects of the training on emotional reactions
to the stressor, a MANCOVA was computed on the mood
ratings after the anagram-stress task, with the three mood
ratings prior to the anagram task serving as covariates. This
analysis revealed no training effect for either sample
(p[ .7).3
Stress After Anagram Task
For the group of non-dysphoric students, no significant
main effect of training on the stress ratings was found, F(3,
29) = .95, p[ .4, gp
2 = .09. For the dysphoric partici-
pants, however, the analysis yielded a significant difference
in stress ratings between training and control group, F(3,
18) = 3.29, p = .044, gp
2 = . 35. Univariate ANCOVAs
indicated that the training was particularly associated with
less tension after the anagram task, F(1, 20) = 6.81,
p = .017, gp
2 = .25, in that participants in the training
group showed lower scores on the stress subscale than
those in the control group (M = 2.8, SD = 1.1 vs.
M = 4.1, SD = .9). In contrast, no significant group dif-
ferences were found on the other two subscales (anxious:
F(1, 20) = 1.05, p[ .3, gp
2 = .05; relaxed: F(1,
20) = .25, p[ .6, gp
2 = .01). These results show that
2 These results remained non-significant after including the baseline
compatibility effect as a covariate (p[ .791).
3 Including the baseline compatibility effect as a covariate did not
change these results (p[ .475).
Table 3 Mean compatibility effects (standard deviations) in mil-










Pre-induction 67 131 62 -2
(T1) (159) (129) (84) (123)
Pre-training 40 127 38 52
(T2) (86) (159) (107) (93)
Post-training 166 54 171 58
(T3) (110) (152) (226) (174)
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dysphoric participants in the training group were less tense
than dysphoric individuals in the control group. The
training did not have this protective effect for non-dys-
phoric students (see Table 4). When adding baseline
compatibility scores as covariate, the main effect of train-
ing on tension in the dysphoric group became non-signif-
icant, F(1, 18) = 1.62, p[ .2, gp
2 = .08, while the
interaction of training with initial compatibility effect
reached marginal significance, F(1, 18) = 3.04, p = .098,
gp
2 = .15. This suggests that the size of the initial com-
patibility bias moderates the training effect, with larger
bias scores being related to less tension after the training.
To further investigate whether the training was indeed
significantly more effective in decreasing tension in
dysphoric than in non-dysphoric participants as indicated
by the ANCOVA above, an additional 2 (training: posi-
tivity vs. control) 9 2 (SDS group: dysphoric vs. non-
dysphoric) ANCOVA was conducted on the tension ratings
after the anagram task, again using the tension ratings prior
to the task as covariate. Results revealed a marginally
significant interaction effect of training with SDS group,
F(1, 56) = 3.33, p = .073, gp
2 = .06. Although this inter-
action effect fell short of statistical significance, it is
compatible with our finding that the training differentially
affected emotional vulnerability to stress in dysphoric and
non-dysphoric individuals. Finally, we also computed a
comparable analysis in which SDS scores were used as a
continuous variable, instead of using them to create two
groups of dysphoric vs. non-dysphoric students. In this
analysis, the critical SDS 9 training group interaction was
not significant, F(1, 56) = .908, p[ .3, gp
2 = .02. This
suggests that the relation between dysphoria and training
benefit may be non-linear, supporting the cut-off score
suggested by Zung (1973).
Discussion
The primary aim of the second study was to investigate
whether a general positivity training is able to induce a bias
towards positive materials, compared to a neutral control
training. We investigated this question in a sample of
dysphoric and non-dysphoric students who received a
negative mood induction. Unfortunately, a substantial
number of participants had to be excluded from the anal-
yses because for them, the mood induction was ineffective
(about 40 % of the total sample). This surprisingly low
potency of the mood induction limits our findings, as well
as the resulting small sample size of the four experimental
participant groups. In line with our expectations, we suc-
cessfully modified a positivity bias to emotional informa-
tion by means of the training. Participants who received the
positivity training showed an increase in their compatibility
effect after the training, and thus a stronger positivity bias.
This was true despite the fact that both dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants showed a positive bias before the
training already. No such change was found in the control
group. Similar to the first study, the training did not directly
influence participants’ mood, neither in the group of dys-
phorics nor in the group of non-dysphoric students. These
results are in line with the meta-analytical review by
Hallion and Ruscio (2011), which suggests that CBM
trainings reveal their effects only after exposure to a
stressor.
The second aim was to investigate if stress reactivity
was affected by the general positivity training, which
would be indicative of a therapeutic value. In line with our
Table 4 Mean scores (standard deviations) of mood and stress scores
before (T2) and after (T3) the training and after (T4) the stress task in
Study 2
Positive training Control training
T2 T3 T4 T2 T3 T4
Dysphoric
Mood
Happy 1.5 2.7 2.2 1.47 3 2
(.71) (1.42) (1.14) (.83) (1.46) (.93)
Sad 4.3 3 3 4.33 2.6 2.4
(.68) (1.05) (1.56) (1.23) (1.18) (1.55)
Content 2.5 3 1.8 1.93 3.2 1.67
(1.08) (1.05) (.63) (1.34) (1.21) (1.18)
Stress
Tense 3.2 2.2 2.8 4.07 2.8 4.07
(1.62) (1.4) (1.14) (1.22) (.56) (.88)
Anxious 2.9 1.7 1.8 2.67 2 1.6
(1.52) (1.25) (.99) (1.63) (1.41) (1.24)
Relaxed 2.1 3.2 2.6 1.8 3.27 2.2
(1.37) (1.55) (1.51) (1.08) (1.03) (1.21)
Nondysphoric
Mood
Happy 1.39 2.83 2.22 1.5 3.06 2.33
(.98) (.92) (1) (.99) (1.06) (1.09)
Sad 4.44 2.39 2.44 4 1.56 1.89
(1.29) (1.24) (1.58) (1.28) (1.29) (1.41)
Content 2.06 2.94 1.39 2.78 3.56 1.5
(1.47) (.8) (1.09) (1.06) (.86) (1.34)
Stress
Tense 3.89 2.83 3.61 3.11 2.28 3.11
(.76) (.92) (1.42) (1.28) (1.78) (1.68)
Anxious 2.89 1.28 1.06 2.61 1 .94
(1.45) (1.02) (1.06) (1.38) (1.33) (1.26)
Relaxed 1.67 2.72 2.33 2.28 3.67 2.33
(1.09) (1.6) (1.53) (.9) (1.78) (1.33)
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hypothesis, we found that the training served to modify
emotional vulnerability and as a consequence, functioned
as a buffer against stress. The PT group showed lower
tension levels in response to the anagram task than the
control group. In this regard, the effectiveness of the gen-
eral positivity training is comparable to former CBM
approaches, despite the unspecific selection of generally
positive and negative stimulus materials. However, the
findings have to be interpreted cautiously considering the
fact that we relied on self-reported stress. The two ratings
‘‘tension’’ and ‘‘relaxation’’ can be interpreted as two
counterparts of the physiological stress reaction, while the
rating ‘‘anxiety’’ can be seen as the emotional consequence
of this physiological reaction. In our study, only tension
reduced significantly, while this buffer effect of training on
emotional vulnerability was not present in the sample of
non-dysphoric students. This seems to contradict earlier
studies demonstrating effects in unselected samples of
students (MacLeod et al. 2002; See et al. 2009). A possible
explanation might be that the anagram stress task was of
relatively low intensity. The induced stress may have been
just strong enough to provoke tension in dysphoric indi-
viduals, but may have been too mild to produce the
equivalent emotional reaction, that is, anxiety in dysphoric
students. Furthermore, non-dysphoric individuals may have
been even less emotionally affected. This explanation is
conceivable because, in contrast to the anagram stress task
used by MacLeod et al. (2002), our participants were not
videotaped, and they did not receive negative feedback
about their performance in this task. As in Study 1, the
intensity of the stressor in the present study might still have
been too low for the group of non-dysphoric participants to
elicit meaningful variations in stress responses between the
training and the control condition. For follow-up studies
focusing on emotional vulnerability, we therefore recom-
mend to ensure enough variation in the experienced levels
of stress. Future studies might also benefit from focusing
on disorder-relevant situations, for example self-esteem-
related situations in depressive patients. Above that, stress
measurements that do not rely solely on self-report (i.e.,
physiological measures of stress) should be included in
future studies.
In sum, the present findings are in line with earlier
research showing that cognitive biases can be induced
without having an immediate consequence on the emo-
tional state of a person. Thus, the general positivity training
does not serve as a positive mood induction that would help
to recover from negative emotions. Rather, as already
suggested by Mathews and MacLeod (2005), emotional
consequences become apparent in subsequent situations,
when the induced bias is actively used to process emotional
information, such as in the anagram stress task.
General Discussion
Both our studies demonstrate that it is possible to modify
approach-avoidance tendencies by means of a general
CBM training that, in contrast to existing CBM methods,
relies on a disorder-non-specific selection of positive and
negative stimuli. This suggests that CBM training effects
are not restricted to the use of content-specific information,
but extend to the modified processing of emotionally
valenced information in general. In the first study, we
showed that the negativity training can reverse an initial
positivity bias in a sample of healthy individuals. However,
the positivity training was not able to further strengthen
this initial bias. In order to obviate this potential ceiling
effect, the second study focused on both an emotionally
vulnerable group and a healthy group in a sad mood state.
In this second study, we successfully modified a bias in
both groups, which demonstrates that the positivity training
was indeed able to strengthen an existing positivity bias. In
this respect, the results of Study 2 were inconsistent with
those of Study 1, and additional research is needed to
reconcile these discrepant findings.
Compared to most other CBM training procedures, this
general AAT is unique in that it targets emotion-driven
action tendencies. Approach-avoidance models (e.g., Elliot
2006) state that approach motivations are triggered by
positive stimuli, whereas avoidance motivations are trig-
gered by negative stimuli. In line with this, we developed a
training that made use of generally positive and negative
stimuli in order to strengthen the corresponding action
tendencies. As demonstrated in the first study, the modifi-
cation of participants’ approach-avoidance tendencies
transferred to attentional processing. This supports the
assumption that approach-avoidance movements influence
the motivational orientation and subsequently enhance the
processing of positive or negative stimuli (Neumann and
Strack 2000). Hence, the effects of the general AAT are not
merely limited to the modification of action tendencies.
They translate to the processing of emotionally valenced
stimuli in general, emphasizing the encompassing nature of
this CBM training. It is unfortunate that time constraints
did not allow us to include the dot probe task in Study 2, so
these results will have to be replicated in future studies.
As expected, the training had no immediate effects on
state emotion, neither for dysphoric nor for non-dysphoric
students. This finding is in line with earlier studies,
showing that biases in cognitive processing can be induced
without eliciting any direct emotional effects (MacLeod
et al. 2002; Mathews and MacLeod 2005). Results of both
studies indicate that the general AAT does not work as a
mood induction in itself. Instead, the mediating role of
environmental factors, as for instance the presence of a
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stressful situation, appears to be crucial when it comes to
effects of the training on mood, as indicated by the atten-
uated stress reactivity of the dysphoric individuals in
response to the anagram stress task.
It should be kept in mind that the dysphoric group in
Study 2 did not show a negativity bias before training.
Therefore, our conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
the general positivity training in attenuating stress-reac-
tivity are based on the fact that we were able to strengthen
a pre-existing positivity bias. However, we did not reverse
an initial negativity bias into a positive one. Individuals
with emotional disorders usually do show a negativity bias
(Mathews and MacLeod 2005). Consequently, future
research should investigate whether the reversal of an ini-
tial negativity bias into a positive one is possible.
The findings in the second study nicely complement
earlier findings, for instance by MacLeod et al. (2002).
Only a few studies, however, have focused on the role of
positive informational processing in emotional vulnerabil-
ity and dysfunction so far. In line with Taylor et al. (2011),
our study provides encouraging support for the notion that
enhancing a bias associated with a healthier processing of
emotional information serves to attenuate stress-reactivity,
in our case in emotionally vulnerable individuals (i.e.,
dysphoric students). Complementing the study by Taylor
and colleagues in anxious participants, this study extends
previous encouraging results of a positive CBM training to
a new group.
To our knowledge, this is the first study indicating that a
general positivity training, which is based on the modifica-
tion of action tendencies, changes stress reactivity and thus
might be of therapeutic value in individuals commonly
known to lack the positive processing biases that are found
in healthy individuals. It is also the first showing cross over
effects with attentional biases. A necessary subsequent step
would be to investigate whether the induction of a positivity
bias also serves to decrease emotional vulnerability in a
sample of clinically depressed patients. Given that partici-
pants in the second study showed only mild symptoms of
depression, it would be premature to draw conclusions
regarding the effectiveness of the training in clinical sam-
ples, especially because our group of dysphoric students
showed a surprising positivity bias already before training.
Although we did not find any effects of the training on
measures of mood directly after the training, the general
positivity training might still be capable of reducing
depressed feelings in the long term. It is conceivable that
promoting healthy processing of emotional information
might serve to decrease depressed mood. However, it
might only do so over a prolonged period of time, when the
modified bias has been repeatedly deployed to selectively
process positive over negative emotional information. In
this way, a strengthened positivity bias might not only
reduce negative reactions to adverse situations, but might
similarly allow people to benefit more from positive
experiences. They might then show a greater increase of
mood in response to a positive situation, compared to those
with a weaker positivity bias or even a bias towards neg-
ative materials.
Finally, it remains unclear which training component
(pulling positive pictures or pushing negative pictures) is
the effective ingredient when it comes to modifying pre-
existing approach-avoidance tendencies and subsequently
to attenuate stress reactivity. The effect of the training
might be due to the ‘‘avoid negative’’ component, to the
‘‘approach positive’’ component, or due to a combination
of both. Future research should focus on identifying the
crucial components that make the training work or which
might make it even more effective (e.g., by using only
positive stimuli that have to be approached continuously).
Research should also investigate the temporal stability of
an induced positivity bias. This is particularly important
when considering the use of such training as an additional
treatment instrument in clinical settings (e.g., Asnaani et al.
2014). In disorders such as depression, clinical improve-
ment might only be achieved by an enduring change in
cognitive biases. For that purpose, follow-up studies are
recommended which focus on more extensive training
procedures, with a greater number of sessions spread over a
prolonged period of time.
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